Moral Meaning vs. Moral Truth

In ethical debate, much attention is given to the establishment of moral truth. It has raged on for centuries and fostered many different camps. However, they all attempt to establish their case by appeal to some sort of fact or goal, but this is misguided because facts and goals are arbitrary human conventions – a social fact of Durkheim’s definition – and any appeal to factual foundations ultimately rings hollow.

There are no moral facts, nor can there be any. This is because ethics deal with normative issues or what should-be-the-case, while facts are confined to positivist issues or what-is-the-case. An example is a gun: in-itself a gun is morally neutral but serves a moral agenda when used by a thief or soldier. Many philosophical theories often appeal to certain phenomena to justify moral value but this is commits G.E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy where normative values cannot be logically derived from positive fact. Theories like utilitarianism merely takes a fact – in this case happiness, a mental state – and assign it a moral value afterward. It is a fact used in moral calculation rather than a fact to base morality on. We thus see that it is impossible a priori to claim the existence of moral fact.

Also, moral justifications cannot occur independently of some aim or goal. Instead, moral practices are confined to a certain socio-cultural contexts and the same things can have different meanings in different cultures. This doesn’t mean that they’re meaningless, but simply mean different things to different peoples. Cross-cultural moral disagreements occur because people needlessly attempt to universalize their moral judgments.

The crux of the matter is the mistaken belief that there is moral truth when moral meaning is all there is. Moral meaning is located in the principles of an ethical system. It is an artificial normative standard that bears no correspondence with moral facts: it is a human invention. Attempts at cross-cultural universality of context-specific moral judgments implicitly assume that there is moral knowledge – moral Truth – to be discovered and, what’s more, that disputants possess or approximate it better than others.

One possible argument for moral truth is the similarities in the ethical systems of different cultures. Thou shalt not steal, rape, needlessly kill and so on. Similarities in such these inductive, cross-comparative studies suggest there is some underlying cause for this, but cause is not to be confused with reason. Cause implies a natural mechanism operating independently of human intent, while reason suggests that it is created or invented by humans. Given the absence of moral facts, or at least our inability to ascertain them, we really have no grounds to claim that a moral causes or truths exist ‘out there’. One may of course disagree, perhaps citing utilitarianism and the categorical imperative as examples of how we elicit moral facts, but this is mistaken. Utility and intention are psychological phenomena. They are in-themselves amoral facts from which moral truth cannot be derived. It is we who give them a normative value, a moral meaning. Claiming moral truth is a mistake: there is only invented moral meaning.

In the absence of moral Truth, we must consider why moral systems are still persist. In any given society, ethics are overtly or tacitly instituted and practiced. Although there are no moral facts, hence the correspondence theory of truth is out, life still follows the moral clauses of a given society.

One explanation for this seemingly irrational phenomenon is the social Panopticon. Members of a given society may not all converge on a single ethical paradigm but it is followed simply because deviance results in punishment and obedience is thus the most rational choice. This punishment need not be codified into a formal system of crime and punishment. Instead, punishment can simply be a frown, glare, ostracism, expulsion or similar expressions of moral disapproval. Given the human instinct for social recognition and approval, the awareness that certain acts will be frowned upon provide ample reason to abstain from it – even if one doesn’t completely agree with the moral paradigm – and the ethical system continues to be practiced.

The other sociological explanation is institutional: the codification and transmission of ethical standards by power structures, with an accompanying system of enforcement. The school, for example, inculcates some degree of morality by prohibiting certain acts, such as theft, while encouraging others, such as respect for authority. The formal would possibly merit detention while the latter earns praise. Other similar institutions include religion and the judicial system where a formal structure is present and recognized as an authority on normative issues, resulting in the perpetuation of an ethical paradigm that no single lay individual is able to alter and the moral status quo is thus preserved, at least in the short-run.

The Panopticon and Institutional explanations also account for the system’s resistance to change: few are willing to risk their standing by desecrating social customs. Of course, some degree of questioning may be permitted depending on the group’s zeitgeist and the rights accorded to them, but certain issues will remain out-of-bounds. These OB markers may protect the group’s most fundamental beliefs or social structures and maintain the socio-political status quo for upheaval will disrupt the process of economic production. Put it simply, social ethics and its rule-based interactions is analogous to Thomas Hobbe’s ‘Leviathan’ government: it prevents anarchy and protects man from preying upon his neighbor.

In conclusion, it has been argued that absolute moral Truth is a chimeral claim. There is no logical method of deriving moral value from amoral facts. Instead, there is only moral meaning. Ethics is ultimately an invented human construction that serves to solidify and stabilize the existing social order by providing rules or guidelines to govern social interactions and transactions. This rule-based perspective may not have the ‘legitimacy’ of ethical theories based on purported fact but its position has better logic and potential empirical foundations.

Facebook Activism Against Religious Bigotry

(Image is here)

Found on Facebook:

“This is from Chris Preston which i think is a fabulous reminder that we are free to live our lives.

Today (Wednesday, November 18th) I left my voice lesson and noticed two adults on campus holding signs that said “Homosexuality is a sin”. First, I would just like to say that I support people with their own opinions. I think that everyone is entitled to their right to think what they want. However, when someone comes on my campus, where I pay tuition to live, I don’t think it’s appropriate to rub such a hateful sign in someone’s face. I decided that because this woman thought it was okay to make me feel uncomfortable in my home, I would retaliate and make her feel just as uncomfortable, if not more.

This woman was wearing a ankle-length corduroy skirt, which, as we all know, is a fashion nono. So, in order to make her feel uncomfortable, I stood next to her and held a sign that said Corduroy skirts are a sin! I don’t think I have ever drawn so much attention in my life. SO many people asked to take a picture with me, I got laughs, high fives and there were the few that even cursed off the woman standing behind me.

As I drew interest to what was going on with myself and the woman with the hateful sign, I started to draw a crowd that stood with me in support. Before I knew it I had 100+ people holding signs for gay rights asking people to honk their horns to support. I was interviewed by a news station, and more than 5 student organization papers, and the post standard of syracuse.

I never expected anybody to come stand by me and support and I appreciate it so much that everyone came! It meant so much and it proved to those ignorant people that we aren’t afraid, and we will put up a fight.

I’m proud that Syracuse has such a homosexual friendly community.”

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This incident illustrates the need for an inclusive liberal ethos – moral bigotry breeds conflict because it forces the ethical norms of one community onto another that doesn’t see eye-to-eye.

The religious right are and should be free practice their way of life among themselves, but it stops with their community. Regardless of the religion in question, unless their religion rests on indubitable premises they have no license for moral bigotry.

The fundamental problem lies in the very nature of what I call ‘hegemonic’ religions – religions whose ideology advocates that their ‘God’ is the only true god and its word has the utmost legitimacy. Once the absolute nature of this god is accepted, it follows that the entailing ideology will too but the latter often involves proselyter practices and the condemnation of all contrary value systems. This in turn breeds conflict because it is incommensurable with anything less than an utterly uniform society along religious lines.

But upon further inspection, there is little ground for such holier-than-thou attitudes. I shall try to sum up the main arguments* about god and present my own analysis.

The cosmological argument states that the world needs to have been caused by something – a First cause – but we soon arrive at a paradox. Either we fall into an infinite regress where each antecedent cause has another antecedent cause and so on – yet our causal understanding demands that something creates the world because logic dictates that nothing can come of nothing. We thus arrive at a logical paradox that does not establish the existence of the divine.

Another position is called the ontological argument focusing on the nature of god’s character. This may only apply to the ‘Abrahamic’ religions. Imagine a perfect being imbued with every desirable trait, except existence. Since a perfect being that exists is better than one that does not, the perfect god described in religious texts must exist. This position has many loopholes. Firstly, the notion of ‘desirability’ is itself predicated on the values described in religious texts and using them to justify the same god begs the question of whether the texts are actually sound to begin with. Note that successful prophecy is not the measure of god, because there can be many explanations for an outcome (e.g. the devil at work). Furthermore, the nature of the text is also in question because it is a human compilation based on purported divine influence – which appears to defy attempts to indubitably prove. The ontological argument is thus also indeterminate.

The third and, in my opinion, strongest argument is the teleological argument or argument by design. It holds that the apparent purpose in natural relations cannot be the result of mere, random evolution because it is like a gust of wind blowing through a junkyard and building a 747. However, the ostensible strength of this argument is illusory. Firstly, the awe of natural design may simply be due to our ignorance of the laws of nature. One need only remember that the Greeks once thought Apollo was responsible for the sun’s movement. Our failure to fully comprehend natural phenomena yet cannot serve as a justification of divine existence because it proves nothing. Secondly, if there was indeed a Grand Designing entity, it does not establish the nature of the designer(s) and thus fails to sufficiently establish the existence of a particular god – we cannot establish whether Ahura Mazda (Zoroastorianism) or the Holy Trinity (Christianity) created the world but followers of both faiths hold their God to the the ONE uncreated Creator. Since the teleological argument is an inference from ignorance and fails to establish anything of value even if true, it cannot establish the existence of the religious divine.

However, note that these arguments do not serve as an a priori refutation of god’s existence. Unless there is some compelling communication from Above, gods remain in the realm beyond experience – the Kantian noumena – where knowledge is impossible.

The implications of these arguments and their flaws is fairly straightforward: proselytes have no justification for moral ‘imperialism’. It is extremely difficult to conclusively justify which ethical beliefs are ‘better’ than others and the imposition of our beliefs on others is unfounded. I believe none of us would want to feel pressurized into accepting a faith we don’t believe in. This is why a liberal ethos is essential: so that we may put our ethics into practice in our own communities without fear or prejudice from others. This is the whole point: to avoid conflict and live alongside each other for the antithesis of peaceful coexistence is acrimony and conflict.

It may be argued that liberalism is itself a value system that conflicts with other value systems, but the liberal ethos is one of the few that actually acknowledges the freedom of other systems. It is an inclusive ethos and I dare say it is best suited for the cultural plurality of our globalised world.

VIVA LA LIBERTY

19th December 2009

*The 3 Arguments are adapted from The Story of Philosophy by Bryan Magee

Wittgenstein’s Beetle Eats Ethnography

Wittgenstein’s Beetle is an analogy about the nature of language. Suppose we all had a box and we’re told there’s a beetle inside each one. However, we can’t see each other’s boxes and the term ‘beetle’ eventually refers to the contents of all the boxes. It is, in other words, a misnomer that attaches a common label to different things.

This has implications on the veracity of ethnography in sociology, anthropology and other similar social sciences. For example, sociological inquiry involves understanding the value system prevalent in a given society because human actions are in large part value-driven. The problem arises because the survey/interview questions often used in such research is vague. “I put my familial responsibilities above work commitments” is a possible ethnographic question but the terms ‘responsibility’, ‘commitment’ and ‘above’ are relative to an individual’s definition. The statistical compilation of such responses to may thus refer to different things altogether and the data collected becomes a meaningless indicator that sheds little light on the subject.

Perhaps the problem lies in the nature of human inquiry. It would be impractical to reconstruct individuals’ belief systems, complete with mitigating factors and contingent conditions, because the voluminous data collected would be extremely unwieldy. It could also be argued that society is built upon shared values rather than individual ones and the latter category is of secondary importance. Indeed, the norms of many social institutions are directed top-down where ‘top’ refers to an individual (e.g. the Queen), collective body (e.g. Parliament) or convention (e.g. trade). Their functions proceed upon clear definitions of acceptability and procedure whether explicit (e.g. the law) or otherwise (e.g. buying and selling) but these definitions are external to the individual. Perhaps individual beliefs are indeed beside the point in ‘macro’ ethnography.

What do you think? Does Wittgenstein’s Beetle really rob ethnography of its research value? Or is the Beetle completely irrelevant to the study of the human species?

10th December 2009

Simulative Engagement in Literary & Dramatic Works

I‘ve always wondered why people are drawn to literary and theatrical arts even though they can be so tragic, destructive or inspire outright horror. It is clear that these arts have a dramatic dimension that distinguishes its plot from the humdrum of normal everyday living – and that is the point: I hypothesise that we are so drawn towards these arts because they engage by way of simulating experiences that we may rarely experience.

This simulative engagement captures certain wants or ideals closely linked to human desire. If we were to approach the issue by genre, we see that they commonly embody particular sentiments. Take romance for instance, a genre that rarely fails to captivate audiences. Whether it is a fairytale a la Disney or a tragedy of the Shakespearean sort, it centers around the human desire for romantic love. The movie Moulin Rouge has an epithet that captures this desire: “the greatest thing you can learn is to love and be loved in return”. This reciprocal romance continues to find ready audiences from Victorian “classics” like Austen’s Pride & Prejudice to the rather… er… ‘low’ art of the Twilight series.

Whether it is the hero of romance or the valor of military heroes, fiction only becomes aesthetically arousing through our empathic faculties. We do not understand characters’ sentiments per se – characters do not exist. Instead, it is through empathic role-playing that we begin to feel what characters might be feeling. The impulse of romantic passions, the thrill of battle and the agony of tragedy only comes ‘alive’ when we place ourselves in the characters’ shoes and enter into the aesthetic simulation that fictional arts provide. Of course, the aesthetic experience is not limited to this. We are often required to ‘step back’ and see the larger picture as well. From the Chinese tale of The Butterfly Lovers to Shakespeare’s Othello, the tragedy is enhanced when we retrospectively appreciate the adversity facing the protagonists’ struggle to love. Empathy, then, is not a sufficient condition for aesthetic attraction but a necessary one.

Another popular genre is war heroism. This often rests on an ethical system that puts the protagonists’ faction of higher moral ground or, at least, hides their moral blemishes for only then can an audience be motivated to empathise with the plot. These genres may also be informed by history and have spawned now-famous titles of historical fiction such as the movie Flag of Our Fathers. The desire for simulative engagement actually finds greater evidence beyond the aesthetic realm in digital games. The now ubiquitous game of Halo for instance puts one in the shoes of a planetary hero fighting against hostile alien invaders: it gives players a heroic scenario that one cannot find in today’s ordered and peaceful society where the primordial urge for martial superiority is suppressed and cornered into other outlets. Again, this is not an unlimited generalisation – most people do not desire war because of its devastation but the want of heroic status has an undoubtedly strong appeal nevertheless, an appeal that propagandists often utilise.

It is also plausible that simulative engagement is also sought after because of its distractive value, diverting our attention away from the throes of woes and vicissitudes of fickle fortune. Aldous Huxley wrote “we no longer buy entertainment, we buy relief”. If true, simulative engagement does indeed temporary diversion from worldly concerns by plunging us into the depths of fantasy, dreams and imagination. The human condition is fraught with economic anxieties, social pressures and issues that all but the most ascetic monk are wrought with for “in our generation there is no great war, no Great Depression. The great war is a spiritual war. The Depression is our lives.” (from the book Fight Club). The distractive value hypothesis also explains the general appeal of entertainment – aesthetic and otherwise – as a panacea for existential pains and in turn suggests that the human psyche is more at home in dreamland than reality.

In conclusion, aesthetic works and those with entertainment value are so desired because they are forms of simulative engagement that provides a distractive value. This value appeals to some of our most primordial desires and ideals that we may be hard-pressed to achieve in reality but, through empathic imagination, are able to artificially savour for a short time. One might arguably call it a form of delusion for fiction is ultimately a pseudo-reality created by the human imagination.

30th November 2009